At a United Nations Security Council briefing on 23 January 2026, senior UN officials and national representatives described a rapidly evolving security and humanitarian landscape in Syria, with particular emphasis on the volatility of the north and northeast, the fragility of recent ceasefire understandings between the Syrian authorities and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and the continuing risk that ISIL could exploit the current disorder.
Khaled Khiari, Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East in the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), framed the Council’s first Syria meeting of the year as taking place amid “significant developments” in northern and northeastern Syria and stressed that the situation remained fluid. He recounted that a further round of talks on 4 January—aimed at implementing the 10 March 2025 agreement between the Syrian government and the SDF—did not yield progress. Shortly afterwards, clashes erupted in and around SDF-controlled neighbourhoods of Aleppo, notably Ashrafia and Shikh Makuds, producing intense fighting and civilian displacement. While the Syrian government reportedly introduced measures intended to reduce harm to civilians, including humanitarian corridors, Khiari referred to public reporting indicating that tens of thousands fled and that, although many had begun returning, the episode left a severe toll: thousands killed, hundreds wounded, and persons still missing.
Against this backdrop, Khiari described subsequent military and territorial shifts that reconfigured the balance of control in the northeast. He stated that on 11 January the SDF withdrew east of the Euphrates toward northeastern Syria, and that on 17 January Syrian government forces moved across the Euphrates and took control of broader areas previously held by the SDF, with local populations in some places also taking territory from the SDF, at times with mediation from the United States and other international partners. On 18 January, a ceasefire and full integration agreement was announced between President Ashara and SDF leader General Muslim Abdi, intended to halt the fighting and ensure full integration of the three northeastern governorates under central government control. However, Khiari reported that a follow-up meeting on 19 January failed to resolve implementation issues, after which fighting resumed. A further “shared understanding” announced by the Syrian presidency on 20 January provided the SDF a four-day period for consultation, and the SDF expressed its commitment to a ceasefire; Khiari told the Council that the briefing occurred two days into that critical period.
Despite these diplomatic and procedural steps, Khiari emphasized that the immediate operational reality remained unstable. He stated that, as he spoke, “the situation on the ground remains very tense,” citing exchanges of fire and clashes between government forces and the SDF in parts of Hasekeh governorate and on the outskirts of Ayn al Arab—also known as Kobane—described as an SDF-controlled enclave where access was challenging given ongoing clashes. He warned of an “alarming humanitarian protection crisis” and urged all sides to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure and to ensure humanitarian access. Reinforcing this point, he relayed the Secretary-General’s concern about continuing violence, the call for respect for international law, and the urging of the parties to remain in dialogue and move forward “in good faith” toward implementation of existing agreements.
Khiari appealed directly to both sides to adhere immediately to a ceasefire consistent with the 18 January agreement and to move swiftly—“in a spirit of compromise”—to define and implement the details of the 20 January understanding, framing this as necessary for the peaceful integration of northeast Syria and, by extension, for the country’s broader political transition. In that context, he highlighted a recent Decree No. 13 announced by President al-Sharaa concerning the linguistic, cultural, and citizenship rights of Syrian Kurds within the Syrian state, characterizing this as a crucial issue for Syria’s future and an encouraging initiative that should be developed further through a genuinely inclusive process. He linked the durability of the transition not only to security arrangements but also to institutional milestones, including the formation of a people’s assembly, the establishment of a committee to draft a permanent constitution, and the creation of a constitutional court, presented as mechanisms through which equitable political participation—including meaningful participation by women—could be advanced.
Security concerns, however, remained central to the briefing. Khiari stressed that ISIL continued to pose a persistent threat and that it was “vital” the group not be allowed to capitalize on instability in the northeast. He stated that the UN shared concerns regarding the presence of foreign terrorist fighters in Syria, and he pointed to a specific operational risk arising from the recent fighting: control of some detention centres holding ISIL fighters reportedly shifted from the SDF to government forces, as did al-Hol camp in Hasakeh, with indications that some detainees escaped. He urged careful attention to ensure that any transfers of detention facilities still under SDF control occur in an orderly manner. He further noted a separate development announced by the United States on 21 January: a mission to transfer ISIL detainees from Syria to Iraq, with 150 ISIL members held in Hasakeh already transported to a secure facility in Iraq.
Khiari also described wider fault lines that could destabilize the transition, pointing to persistent tensions along sectarian and ethnic lines, often aggravated by hate speech and disinformation. He cited recent violent incidents, including a deadly attack at a mosque on 26 December that the Secretary-General condemned, emphasizing that attacks on civilian and religious sites were unacceptable. He stated that the Syrian Foreign Ministry condemned the attack and reiterated commitments to counterterrorism and to security for all Syrians, and that Syrian authorities subsequently prevented an attempted attack on a church in Aleppo. He additionally expressed concern about unresolved differences and escalating rhetoric in Suwayda governorate, including sporadic clashes between Syrian forces and local groups and militia, and reported “intrahouse” tensions such as detentions and assassinations in areas outside government control. The UN, he said, continued to urge engagement with the “Aman road map” of 16 September 2025 and the adoption of confidence-building measures to restore trust and stability.
On Syria’s southern front, Khiari warned that Israeli incursions continued to undermine Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. He welcomed the Council’s extension of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) mandate for another six months and reiterated the Secretary-General’s call for Israel to refrain from violations of Syrian sovereignty and territorial integrity, while urging respect for the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement and calling for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from areas entered after 8 December 2024. He noted, at the same time, that the UN was encouraged by resumed contacts between Syria and Israel aimed at reaching mutually acceptable security arrangements.
The humanitarian picture presented to the Council combined measured signs of improvement with persistent structural fragility. Edem Wosornu, Director of the Crisis Response Division at the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), stated that Syrians across the country continued to work toward a brighter future despite ongoing challenges. She reported that more than 3 million refugees and internally displaced persons had returned to their homes since December 2024, and that some humanitarian indicators showed limited improvement. Food security, she said, had improved slightly, but only one in five families consistently met their nutritional needs—an indicator suggesting that marginal gains remained insufficient to secure broad-based resilience.
National representatives echoed elements of the UN’s framing while advancing state-centric approaches to security and responsibility-sharing. Ibrahim Olabi, Syria’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, stated that Syrian authorities recognized the long-standing suffering of Syrian Kurdish compatriots due to marginalization and denial of rights, and expressed satisfaction at their participation in new state institutions alongside other Syrian communities. He reported that the Ministry of Interior had apprehended the majority of escaped detainees and continued efforts to pursue remaining individuals, arguing that extended state sovereignty and the rule of law constituted the only permanent guarantee of security, stability, and effective counterterrorism. He added that the Syrian government welcomed the American operation transferring ISIL detainees from Syrian territory to Iraq and affirmed readiness to provide logistical and security support to facilitate it.
From Iraq’s perspective, Lukman Al-Faily, Iraq’s Permanent Representative, stated that receiving foreign terrorists whose states refused to repatriate them was a measure aimed at protecting regional and international security from an imminent threat. At the same time, he warned against allowing this issue to become a long-term strategic burden borne by Iraq alone, criticizing the refusal by some states to repatriate their nationals as unacceptable.
The briefing presented Syria’s transition as proceeding in parallel tracks that are mutually conditioning and mutually vulnerable: security stabilization in the northeast and south, humanitarian protection and access under active conflict conditions, institutional sequencing toward inclusive governance, and an unresolved international burden-sharing problem centred on foreign terrorist fighters and detention management. Across these domains, UN officials returned repeatedly to a single operational hinge: the immediate ceasefire and implementation process between the Syrian authorities and the SDF, framed as both a test of political compromise and a precondition for preventing renewed cycles of violence and opportunistic reconstitution by ISIL within a still-fragile post-conflict environment.
Simon Gros 
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