Sybrand Veeger, a researcher at KU Leuven whose work focuses on Spinoza’s metaphysics and political psychology, has engaged in a detailed examination of Spinoza’s treatment of “pride” (superbia) in both the Ethics and the Political Treatise. His discussion, presented at the Conference “Spinoza and Negativity” in Leuven, explores how Spinoza’s emphasis on the commonality of human nature leads to a complex diagnosis of pride’s manifestation in rulers and in ordinary individuals alike. This view arises from several interlocking themes: the ontological structure of human conatus, the psychological mechanisms that cause individuals to overestimate their own power, and the political consequences that emerge when such overestimation governs the behavior of those in positions of authority. These concerns resonate with longstanding interpretations of the Ethics that draw on Descartes’ account of l’orgueil (Superbia) in Les Passions de l’Âme and relate to conceptions of greed, ambition, and other passions that similarly threaten the equilibrium of body and mind.
The inquiry begins with Spinoza’s assertion that a stable monarchy should guarantee the freedom of the multitude rather than exercise oppressive or secretive strategies. This argument rests on the premise that all people share a common nature and that rulers, no matter their exalted status, remain susceptible to the same passions as everyone else. Veeger shows how Spinoza explicitly links pride to the self-delusion of believing oneself above common humanity, an attitude that in turn provokes secrecy, misjudgment of the multitude, and an ever-increasing sense of entitlement. The Political Treatise depicts proud rulers as shameless, arrogant, and extravagantly wasteful. These rulers also cultivate a deceptive aura of superhuman standing, crafted from a “concert” of proud efforts that fosters the belief that the population, perceived as ignorant, has no capacity to grasp decisions made at the highest levels of power.
Veeger highlights Spinoza’s further explanation that this distorted self-image leads to a dangerous projection mechanism. When political figures act out of pride, they evaluate the populace through a lens of perceived inferiority, conclude that most people are too unenlightened to understand governance, and engage in secrecy to protect their own sense of infallibility. The result is a vicious cycle: misled citizens interpret official actions in the worst possible light, intensifying rulers’ contempt and reinforcing the oppressive measures designed to stifle dissent. In Spinoza’s account, such a climate of fear and hidden violence imperils the stability of the state, since it sets the stage for resistance and turmoil whenever a significant part of the multitude attempts to expose or resist these secret machinations.
This cautionary theme finds support in Ethics III and IV, where Spinoza develops a rigorous model of the passions as forces that can become pathologically excessive. Pride, as an extreme form of self-love, differs from other harmful passions—such as gluttony, lust, ambition, or greed—because it centers on an inflated sense of one’s own power rather than on an external object like food, sexual pleasure, money, or social rank. Yet pride is similarly classified as delirium, marked by open-eyed dreaming about one’s abilities and achievements, with no accompanying acknowledgement of one’s limitations. Veeger notes that in Spinoza’s analysis, an important regulatory mechanism for self-love is the recognition of frustration or limitation; only when individuals encounter the reality of their impotence or inability do they rein in the fantasy of boundless capability. Rulers protected by their power are often shielded from this moderating frustration and therefore risk developing what Laurent Bove labels a “desire to be a god,” a self-deluding effort to transcend human constraints.
Veeger connects these psychological insights to Spinoza’s broader observation that pride is what sets rulers apart in a monarchy, referencing the claim that “pride is what sets rulers apart” (TP7.27). This condition thrives in a political environment where parasites or flatterers (adulatores) magnify the ruler’s vanity through incessant overestimation. According to Spinoza, flattery fortifies a proud individual’s delusion by reinforcing self-love without the opposing experience of frustration or failure, thus creating a spiral of self-congratulatory joy that Spinoza calls a “delirium.” Individuals who flatter, driven by passions such as ambition or greed, gain advantages under a ruler’s favor, yet they enable an intensification of the ruler’s destructive misperceptions. When those in power come to believe themselves above the reach of human frailties, they readily justify political violence, clamp down on criticism, and perpetuate the myth of their own exceptional nature.
In Veeger’s account, the alignment of Spinoza’s ethical-ontological outlook with his political reflections makes pride into a paradigm of how the conatus can become wildly misdirected. The compulsion to expand one’s power indefinitely is part of human striving, yet when no adequate checks confine that expansion, the result is a tyrannical style of governance. Spinoza warns that unchecked pride leads to oppression, arbitrary cruelty, and a contempt for the population so severe that it undermines the very security rulers seek to preserve. Veeger underscores the precise way Spinoza distinguishes legitimate self-love (acquiescentia in se ipso) from its delirious excess: legitimate self-love is rooted in real actions and accomplishments, tempered by the knowledge of limitations, while Superbia becomes unmoored from any recognition of external constraints or the natural equality of human nature.
These reflections are corroborated by Spinoza’s correspondences with Cartesian ideas of passions as well as by the scholarly tradition exploring the broader context of monarchical power in early modern Europe. The question of how best to constrain pride within governance intersects with other forms of excessive desire, including greed and ambition, which act as triggers for mutual flattery and the escalation of violent rule. Veeger’s treatment of these issues reveals that Spinoza’s attack on the delusion of rulers’ superiority is as much an ontological indictment as it is a socio-political one, since pride distorts the basic unity of nature that binds all individuals. In the final tally, this shared vulnerability to delirium underscores the danger of imbalances in power, for any person who goes unchecked may succumb to the same destructive illusions that imperil entire societies.
By concluding that pride disrupts every tier of human interaction—personal, social, and political—Veeger draws attention to the widespread relevance of Spinoza’s critique. Under conditions in which flattering parasites foster the ruler’s unchecked vanity and secrecy, the multitude experiences oppression and resorts to desperate means of resistance. Spinoza’s solution, grounded in reason and the balance of political power, calls for a healthy fear that prevents leaders from succumbing to overblown notions of their capabilities. The conference in Leuven foregrounded these points by illustrating how Spinoza’s theory of the passions, and pride in particular, holds deep ramifications for the interpretation of modern governance. Veeger’s perspective ultimately enriches the debate on whether genuine political stability can survive if it lacks mechanisms to keep pride within rational limits, and whether contemporary societies continue to face the same perils that preoccupied Spinoza in his own era.
Sybrand Veeger’s academic contributions on Spinoza’s philosophy provide further context for his perspective on pride. As a doctoral researcher at KU Leuven’s Institute of Philosophy, he specializes in the intersection of metaphysics, political psychology, and the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza. Affiliated with the Husserl-Archives at KU Leuven, he engages with both historical and modern receptions of Spinoza, investigating how the latter’s metaphysical framework influences his understanding of human passions and sociopolitical structures. Veeger’s work extends to examining the ways in which Husserl, Descartes, Kant, and other thinkers have responded to or reinterpreted Spinoza’s monism, with particular interest in how such engagements shed light on Spinoza’s political thought.
His publications include an article on Husserl’s historical reception of Spinoza, “Spinozism: A case-study of Husserlian historical thinking,” where he traces how Spinoza’s rationalist metaphysics becomes a pivotal moment in the teleological evolution of modern thought. Veeger’s research master’s thesis, “Spinoza’s Positive Account of Evil,” offers a distinctive perspective on Spinoza’s stance toward negative passions, arguing that evil and sadness function as “purely positive yet parasitical” forces that diminish an individual’s power. Through analysis of Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza and close readings of the Ethics, he challenges the notion of evil as purely privative, positioning it instead as a real force that can undermine or distort one’s conatus.
Veeger has also delivered several conference papers that illustrate the breadth of his engagement with Spinoza’s philosophy. Besides his presentation on pride at the “Spinoza and Negativity” conference, he has explored Spinoza’s concept of evil at the Collegium Spinozanum IV in Groningen and examined the link between sadness, parasites, and diminished power in Spinoza’s thought at a graduate conference at KU Leuven. Moreover, his investigation into “Kant’s antinomy of pure reason” discusses whether Kant formulated this critique of rational cosmology as a direct response to Spinoza’s infinite, necessary substance.
Veeger’s scholarship, which involves frequent participation in Spinoza workshops and summer schools, reflects an interdisciplinary approach that links metaphysical inquiries to ethical-political outcomes. His work highlights how the passions, and pride in particular, remain central to understanding power relations in society and to discerning the ethical boundaries Spinoza sets to counteract the excesses of overestimation and self-deception. Both in his published writings and conference presentations, Veeger continues to demonstrate the ongoing relevance of Spinoza’s ideas for contemporary debates on political power, governance, and the individual’s capacity for rational self-regulation.
Simon Gros 
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