In this remarkable introduction to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, Peter Hacker takes the reader on a journey through the vast landscapes of language, thought, mind, and human understanding, all the while illuminating the conceptual subtleties of one of the twentieth century’s most influential thinkers. The book stands out by presenting Wittgenstein’s ideas in a congenial manner, speaking directly to those with open minds and a willingness to set aside preconceived notions. Even though the subject matter delves deeply into issues of linguistic meaning, necessity, and the nature of mind, no specialized philosophical background is required: the only requirement is curiosity, coupled with a readiness to look squarely at our inherited assumptions and see how Wittgenstein’s insights may challenge and revise them. Drawing upon almost a lifetime’s worth of scholarship, Hacker’s approach is at once rigorous and accessible, deftly combining a wealth of interpretive clarity with an engaging style that renders even the most daunting philosophical topics not merely comprehensible but genuinely fascinating.
The book’s central concern is the later philosophy of Wittgenstein, especially as developed in his Philosophical Investigations, where language is set before the mind in a way that aims to dissolve confusions rather than offer systematic doctrinal constructions. Hacker initiates his readers into Wittgenstein’s patient exploration of how words acquire meaning through use, how ostensive definitions often disguise the complexities of learning language, and how the picture of thought as a mysterious private process can lead us astray. Resisting the temptation to treat language as a mere code for pre-existing ideas, the volume follows Wittgenstein in investigating how “forms of life,” contextual practices, training, custom, and shared human behavior all underwrite our linguistic sense-making. Hacker’s portrayal of these arguments is informed by his own rigorous scholarship, including decades of engagement with Wittgenstein’s texts. In the process, he clarifies perplexities that have long puzzled newcomers—whether about the role of ostensive definition, the grammar of psychological ascriptions, or the difference between giving a statement and giving a rule for the use of a word.
Like the Philosophical Investigations itself, this Beginner’s Guide traverses topics ranging from the deceptively simple to the dazzlingly subtle. Readers encounter Wittgenstein’s repeated attacks on a broadly “Augustinian” picture of language acquisition that assumes children learn words by first possessing a private, possibly innate, mental storehouse of concepts and then attaching them, via ostensive pointing, to objects in the world. Hacker presents and dismantles this ancient idea in a series of lectures, reminding us that for Wittgenstein, much of early language acquisition is training—habit formation, reinforcement, contextual cues—rather than explanation or definition. Taking the reader by the hand, he shows that the romantic notion of a child coming into language armed with ideas that merely await translation into words cannot stand up to actual observation of how we, from infancy, are molded by the complexities of grammatical usage. As the text unfolds, Hacker both explains Wittgenstein’s arguments against this picture and shows how these arguments continue to reverberate in modern debates over the nature of thought, the role of neuroscientific explanations, and the question of whether language simply expresses concepts formed elsewhere—“in the head,” “in the mind,” or “in the brain.”
Readers also find arresting discussions of necessity and convention, in which Hacker explains Wittgenstein’s pivotal idea that necessity is rooted in grammar, and grammar, in turn, rests on convention, training, custom, and shared ways of acting. The puzzle of how necessary truths could be grounded if they are not discovered in some transcendent realm is clarified by the demonstration that our concept of necessity is woven into the rules of our language—and that these rules, while not arbitrarily chosen, are sustained by agreement in judgments and agreement in forms of life. Hacker’s reflection on these themes is philosophically sophisticated without sacrificing clarity; he manages to combine the colloquial charm of a patient teacher’s voice with the precision of a scholar who has engaged these questions for decades.
The subject of thought and language is handled with particular delicacy. Hacker draws on a series of dialogues that vividly illustrate how, in Wittgenstein’s view, thinking is not an ethereal process that must happen in words or images hidden behind the stream of speech. Rather, we discover that to think is, in the first instance, to be equipped to employ a variety of linguistic and non-linguistic expressions, to follow rules and apply them aptly, to manifest our understanding in action, and, in many cases, to provide reasons for what we say or do. Such an approach puts pressure on the often unexamined assumption that a thinker must always first form silent mental sentences before uttering them aloud. Hacker clarifies that one can, indeed, speak “with thought,” even if one’s interior monologue is absent or minimal, just as one can run with skill even if one’s mind is not busy describing the motion of one’s legs. This perspective is illustrated with the conversation between the author and an interlocutor, where ideas from neuroscientists such as Damasio, Edelman, and Tononi are brought into collision with Wittgenstein’s arguments. We see that although the brain is an essential prerequisite for thought—just as functioning lungs are needed for normal respiration—there is no sense in which the brain alone, an isolated chunk of matter, actually “thinks.” It is the living, language-using human being, the person, who thinks.
What sets the present volume apart is the interspersing of extended dialogues in which Hacker places himself in conversation with imagined questioners, thereby modeling the very sort of philosophical discourse Wittgenstein prized. These dialogues begin by posing the naive but commonly held views, then lead readers step by step through the clarifications and clarifications-upon-clarifications that dissolve the illusions behind such views. The effect is not only intellectually instructive but also entertaining; it conveys the sense that we are privy to a wide-ranging tutorial with one of the preeminent scholars of Wittgenstein as he guides us along the labyrinthine pathways of the Investigations. In this respect, as Adrian W. Moore at the University of Oxford notes, the book is both “entertaining” and “instructive” and is likely to serve as an excellent guide for both curious beginners and advanced readers seeking to refine their understanding of Wittgenstein’s mature thought.
Throughout, Hacker never abandons the central philosophical challenge that Wittgenstein took to be paramount: to help us see how philosophical confusions arise out of misunderstandings of language, and how attention to the grammar of our concepts can, step by step, untangle those confusions. One finds repeated reminders that, for Wittgenstein, the best cure for philosophical bewilderment is not the invention of new scientific theories or the accumulation of more data, but rather the persistent articulation of what we already know at some level—namely, how our language actually functions in the patterns of everyday life. Passages that discuss the mind–body question in the context of knowledge of other minds, or the self’s knowledge of itself, further display Hacker’s nuanced stance. As Dr. Edward Kanterian from the University of Kent says, in a voice resonating with excitement, this is the closest one can get to a “best possible introduction” by “the leading expert” on Wittgenstein. The skill with which Hacker unpacks Wittgenstein’s well-known analogy of pain, expression, and avowal exemplifies precisely that clarity: we see how Wittgenstein’s remarks about pain and the impossibility of a private language illuminate the ways we learn and apply our psychological concepts. Rather than remain mired in mentalistic pictures inherited from centuries of philosophical speculation, we become alive to the intricacies of how expressions of pain, tears, moans, and words find a place in the human form of life.
The theme of self-consciousness also arises, and Hacker, following Wittgenstein, lays out why the grammar of self-reference is distinct from the grammar of reference to external objects. Why does it not make sense for me to look inward and see something that identifies “myself” as if I were observing an external phenomenon in the mind’s eye? Why is it that certain ways of speaking about oneself stand on conceptual bedrock, whereas others are riddled with confusion? The discussion here intersects with moral psychology, pointing to broader implications for how we conceptualize autonomy, responsibility, and self-knowledge. Such passages speak directly to any reader intrigued by the deeper relationship between philosophy and what it means to be a person. Echoing the words of Vasso Kindi, a Professor of Philosophy in Athens, Hacker’s clarity and thoroughness bring these topics to life without sacrificing any subtlety or sophistication. Longtime students of Wittgenstein will appreciate the deftness with which Hacker moves through the terrain of established scholarly debates, from the exegesis of key remarks in the Investigations to the different interpretive schools that sprang up in Wittgenstein’s wake.
Admirers of Hacker’s previous works on philosophy of mind and neuroscience will be pleased to see how he employs that background to clarify Wittgenstein’s position on the uses and misuses of brain-talk. The familiar conflation of mental phenomena with cerebral phenomena is dissected with care, following Wittgenstein’s lead in reminding us that talk of “the brain’s thinking” is misleading if we forget that to think is an ability belonging to the person. When the volume addresses knowledge of other minds, it draws attention to the myriad contexts in which we surmise or confirm another’s thoughts, beliefs, or emotions. The entire approach is governed by the idea that conceptual problems call for conceptual reorientation, not for speculation about hidden events or mental pictures. Once again, as John Cottingham, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Reading, remarks, the book provides “a beautifully lucid and philosophically stimulating introduction” delivered by the field’s “leading authority.”
All along, the reader is guided by Hacker’s steady hand. The dialogues feature a speaker who, in a relaxed, often humorous tone, responds to the frustrations and confusions of hypothetical questioners. Rather than adopt an austere academic tone, Hacker deftly conjures the spirit of an informal workshop, where every question is worth pursuing, every aspect of the question is turned this way and that, so the seeker might see precisely how Wittgenstein’s methods of philosophical clarification operate. And even though the subject matter is weighty—one cannot read about Augustine’s picture of language, the critique of private concepts, the interplay of grammar and human practice, and the vantage points on self-knowledge without sensing the depth of these issues—Hacker’s manner makes it all feel surprisingly accessible, even friendly. Indeed, it is this combination of the highest scholarly depth with a “laid-back colloquial style” that so many readers will find irresistible. Those who are new to philosophy will appreciate the lucid instructions; those well versed in the field will take pleasure in the elegant articulation of arguments too often wrapped in obscure academic jargon. Here, everything is laid bare with an intellectual honesty that does justice to Wittgenstein’s own mission.
By the conclusion of the book, one senses that a comprehensive portrait of Wittgenstein’s later thinking has been sketched out and examined from multiple angles. Although Hacker does not shy away from controversy—he is well known for his willingness to challenge contemporary misunderstandings of Wittgenstein—he manages to do so in a manner that is enlightening rather than intimidating. Readers come away aware of the fundamental questions that powered Wittgenstein’s investigative style: How do we use language to get a grip on reality? What illusions have we inherited from philosophical traditions that misconstrue meaning as a mysterious link between words and objects in the mind or external world? How does one’s mastery of concepts rest not on private, introspectable entities, but rather on publicly shared criteria and forms of training? Why is it that confusion arises so often when we forget that the meaning of “thinking” is anchored in our holistic linguistic practices, our repertoire of expressions, and our capacity to give reasons and justifications?
In short, this is a book unlike any other in the vast literature on Wittgenstein. It consists of seventeen self-contained lectures and dialogues, each capable of standing alone, yet all collectively weaving a panoramic tapestry of the Philosophical Investigations. Whether one is an absolute beginner with a zest for big questions, a more experienced student seeking conceptual clarity, or even a seasoned philosopher who might have underestimated certain aspects of Wittgenstein’s rich textual legacy, this Beginner’s Guide provides an unparalleled opportunity for reflection, conversation, and deepened understanding. Like an invitation to step onto a new philosophical landscape, it opens up Wittgenstein’s fundamental insights in a voice that is confident yet warm, challenging yet deeply humane. The result is at once a serious philosophical undertaking and an enjoyable read, full of humor, patience, and conviction. It is not merely an outline or summary, but a sustained tour de force, marked by the authority only Peter Hacker could bring to the subject he has studied so devotedly. Here, as reviewers from across the academic world affirm, one finds a luminous introduction to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy that will remain a point of reference for anyone interested in how we use words, why we are so prone to conceptual misunderstanding, and how, through careful self-scrutiny, we can achieve the clarity and insight Wittgenstein regarded as the philosopher’s highest aim.
Simon Gros 
Leave a comment