Charlotte Alderwick’s Schelling’s Ontology of Powers offers an innovatively argued engagement with Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling’s metaphysics, presenting a holistic and power-based ontology that combines historical philosophical rigor with contemporary relevance. This book not only re-examines Schelling’s contributions to the post-Kantian philosophical tradition but also situates his thought within the contemporary analytic debates on power-based ontologies, providing a bridge between disparate philosophical traditions and addressing critical gaps in current metaphysical literature.
At the base of Alderwick’s interpretation is the argument that Schelling’s ontology is fundamentally structured around powers—dynamic, relational, and inherently processual forces that form the building blocks of reality. By foregrounding powers as the ontological core, Alderwick revitalizes Schelling’s Naturphilosophie and his Freedom essay, demonstrating their relevance to ongoing discussions in analytic metaphysics concerning causation, modality, and the nature of freedom. Unlike contemporary power-based accounts, which often isolate specific metaphysical issues, Schelling’s system provides a unified vision that synthesizes the micro-level mechanics of natural processes with the macro-level realities of individuality, agency, and human freedom.
Alderwick’s analysis unfolds against a dual backdrop. On the one hand, she traces Schelling’s engagement with the philosophical challenges posed by predecessors such as Kant, Spinoza, and Fichte. Schelling’s move from a substance-based metaphysics to a dynamic ontology of powers reflects a deliberate effort to resolve tensions between determinism and freedom, the infinite and the finite, and the individual and the whole. On the other hand, Alderwick places Schelling in dialogue with contemporary thinkers like Rani L. Anjum, Stephen Mumford, and Alexander Bird, showing how his philosophy anticipates and addresses many of the conceptual difficulties that continue to trouble power-based metaphysics.
One of the book’s central contributions lies in its exploration of the implications of Schelling’s ontology for the problem of human freedom. Alderwick argues that Schelling’s holistic account of powers offers a distinctive solution to the libertarian challenge of reconciling freedom with systematicity. Unlike Kant’s dualism, which relegates freedom to the noumenal realm, or Spinoza’s monism, which subsumes individuality into the absolute, Schelling develops an ontology where freedom emerges as a particular constellation of powers that are neither external to nor reducible to deterministic natural laws. For Schelling, freedom is deeply embedded in the very fabric of reality, arising from the reciprocal interplay of powers that constitute both individuals and the broader systems to which they belong.
Alderwick’s treatment of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie is particularly illuminating. She characterizes it as a precursor to contemporary process ontologies, emphasizing its commitment to the idea that reality is fundamentally dynamic and relational. This interpretation challenges traditional readings that cast Schelling as a transitional figure between German idealism and existentialism, positioning him instead as a pioneering thinker of power-based metaphysics. Alderwick’s account of Schelling’s transition from the Naturphilosophie to the Freedom essay highlights his growing concern with the problem of individuation, which becomes central to his later work. By demonstrating how Schelling’s power-based ontology evolves to address the difficulties of accounting for individuality and agency within a holistic metaphysical system, Alderwick offers a fresh perspective on the unity of his philosophical project.
In addition to its historical contributions, Schelling’s Ontology of Powers engages critically with contemporary debates in analytic metaphysics. Alderwick identifies a significant limitation in current power-based ontologies: their failure to provide a comprehensive account of how powers operate across different levels of reality. Contemporary accounts, she argues, often focus on specific domains, such as causation or ethics, without addressing the holistic interconnections that Schelling’s philosophy brings to the fore. Schelling’s system, by contrast, offers a model for thinking about powers as both micro-level forces and macro-level phenomena, providing a framework for understanding how the causal powers of individual agents relate to the broader systems in which they are embedded.
The book is not without its challenges. Alderwick’s analysis demands careful attention from readers unfamiliar with either Schelling’s work or the contemporary literature on powers. However, her clear articulation of key concepts and her ability to draw meaningful connections between historical and contemporary concerns make the book an invaluable resource for scholars of both German idealism and analytic metaphysics. The rigor of Alderwick’s argumentation, combined with her commitment to bridging philosophical traditions, exemplifies the kind of “post-tribal” philosophizing that she advocates.
Schelling’s Ontology of Powers is a landmark contribution to both the study of Schelling and the broader field of metaphysics. By presenting Schelling’s philosophy as a dynamic and forward-looking system, Alderwick not only deepens our understanding of his work but also challenges contemporary philosophers to rethink the foundational assumptions of power-based ontologies. This book will undoubtedly become a touchstone for future scholarship on Schelling and a vital resource for anyone interested in the intersections of historical and contemporary metaphysical thought.
Simon Gros 
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