In Abolishing Freedom: A Plea for a Contemporary Use of Fatalism, Frank Ruda crafts an audacious and deeply intellectual analysis of the paradoxical relationship between freedom and necessity. At the basis of this work lies a provocative argument: the modern conception of freedom as synonymous with the ability to choose is fundamentally flawed, obscuring a more unsettling truth about human liberty. Ruda contends that true freedom, paradoxically, can only emerge from the acceptance of absolute necessity, a stance that draws upon a rich lineage of philosophical rationalism. This book is a radical intervention into contemporary thought, challenging the ideological centrality of choice and autonomy in both philosophy and culture.
Ruda’s thesis unfolds through an engagement with the works of historical giants—Luther, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and Freud—all of whom, he argues, grappled with the tension between freedom and predestination. By going into the depths of their ideas, Ruda resurrects a long-overlooked insight: these thinkers—celebrated as defenders of reason and freedom—simultaneously embraced fatalism. In doing so, they rejected the reduction of freedom to personal capacity or individual sovereignty. Instead, they situated liberty within the framework of absolute necessity, divine providence, and predestination. For Ruda, this merger of freedom and fatalism offers an indispensable lens through which to critique and ultimately transcend the impoverished notion of freedom as mere choice.
From the outset, Ruda identifies the core problem with contemporary discourse on freedom. Modernity’s obsession with choice has turned freedom into a fetishized capacity, a property owned by individuals, and a cornerstone of liberal ideology. This conception, Ruda argues, is inherently Aristotelian, conflating potentiality with actuality and equating freedom with the realization of possibilities. By dismantling this Aristotelian framework, Ruda’s work aims to exorcise the final vestiges of Aristotelian thought from contemporary philosophy. His method is subversive, presenting a counter-history of rationalism that reveals how the most celebrated defenders of freedom simultaneously upheld fatalism as its necessary precondition.
Ruda begins with Luther, whose vehement opposition to Erasmus’ defence of free will laid the groundwork for a radical rethinking of freedom. For Luther, true faith—and thus true freedom—emerges only through the encounter with absolute necessity, the divine will that operates beyond human comprehension. Luther’s vision of predestination disrupts the Aristotelian notion of freedom as a capacity to be actualized, replacing it with a conception of freedom that begins where human agency ends. Ruda’s analysis of Luther’s “exaggerations”—his relentless defence of divine foreknowledge and predestination—illuminates the theological roots of a fatalistic freedom that is both emancipatory and unsettling.
The work continues through Descartes, whose radical doubt and quest for certainty reveal the necessity underlying freedom. Descartes’ provisional moral code, formulated amidst the dismantling of all certainty, exemplifies the coexistence of freedom and fatalism. Ruda reconstructs how Descartes’ philosophical method hinges on the assumption that the worst has already happened, a foundational fatalism that clears the way for rational autonomy. Through this reading, Ruda challenges conventional interpretations of Cartesian freedom, demonstrating its deep entanglement with necessity.
Kant’s critical philosophy further complicates the relationship between freedom and necessity. By positing the moral law as both a constraint and an expression of autonomy, Kant reveals the paradoxical nature of freedom as something that arises from submission to necessity. Ruda’s analysis of Kant exposes the ways in which the categorical imperative functions as a form of rationalist fatalism, where the recognition of necessity becomes the ground for ethical freedom. Here, Ruda’s critique extends beyond Kant to contemporary philosophical tendencies that fail to grapple with the implications of this paradox.
The culmination of Ruda’s counter-history is Hegel, whose philosophy of absolute spirit epitomizes the unity of freedom and necessity. For Hegel, true freedom is realized not in opposition to necessity but through its immanent unfolding. Ruda’s interpretation of Hegel emphasizes the dialectical movement by which the worst—the alienation and negation inherent in human history—is revealed as always already having occurred. This revelation, far from leading to despair, opens the possibility of freedom as the conscious embrace of necessity. Ruda’s reading of Hegel is both compelling and unsettling, challenging readers to confront the radical implications of absolute fatalism.
The final chapter turns to Freud, whose psychoanalytic theory exposes the illusions of psychical freedom. Freud’s insights into the unconscious reveal the extent to which human behaviour is governed by forces beyond conscious control. For Ruda, Freud’s critique of “psychical freedom” serves as a stark reminder of the limitations of autonomy and the necessity of confronting the determinisms that shape human existence. By integrating Freud into his counter-history, Ruda bridges the gap between philosophical rationalism and modern psychoanalysis, underscoring the enduring relevance of fatalism in understanding freedom.
Throughout Abolishing Freedom, Ruda confronts the ideological underpinnings of contemporary society’s obsession with choice. He critiques the neoliberal valorization of freedom as an individualized capacity, a myth that obscures the structural and existential constraints that define human life. Ruda’s plea for a contemporary use of fatalism is not a call for resignation but a radical reorientation of philosophical and political thought. By embracing the assumption that the worst has already happened, Ruda argues, we can break free from the illusions of choice and autonomy, opening the way for a more profound and transformative understanding of freedom.
This book is a daring philosophical intervention, blending historical analysis with rigorous critique and speculative insight. Ruda’s prose is incisive, challenging readers to grapple with the most unsettling implications of rationalist thought. Abolishing Freedom is a manifesto for a new way of thinking about freedom in an age of ideological disorientation. It is a book that demands engagement, reflection, and, above all, a willingness to confront the unsettling truths that underpin our assumptions about liberty.
In a time when freedom is often reduced to the shallow rhetoric of choice, Ruda’s defense of fatalism is both timely and necessary. Abolishing Freedom shows the enduring power of philosophical inquiry to challenge, disrupt, and transform our understanding of the world and our place within it. It is a work of intellectual audacity, one that invites readers to reconsider the very foundations of their beliefs about freedom and necessity.
Simon Gros 
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