In Diagnosing Social Pathology, Frederick Neuhouser presents a philosophical analysis of societal dysfunction, engaging with complex questions about whether and how societies, like biological organisms, might be understood as being “ill” or “diseased.” This ambitious work brings together Rousseau, Hegel, Marx, and Durkheim, philosophers not typically considered as part of a single tradition, to examine a shared, albeit differently conceptualized, preoccupation with the notion of societal illness. Neuhouser draws on the concept of social pathology to articulate how social dysfunction manifests in terms of alienation, anomie, ideology, and systemic inequalities, arguing that these concepts have allowed thinkers to diagnose and critique underlying social malaise, beyond mere social injustice, as something akin to illness within the social body.
Through a rigorous historical and analytical approach, Neuhouser investigates how these foundational figures in social theory provide frameworks for understanding and identifying social pathologies that compromise both individual and collective well-being. Rousseau’s emphasis on the corrupting influence of civilization, Hegel’s nuanced exploration of alienation through his concept of “objective spirit,” Marx’s critique of capitalist structures and the estrangements they produce, and Durkheim’s sociological study of anomie are, for Neuhouser, varying formulations of a common theme: societies fail their members when their institutions, norms, and structures inhibit the freedom, self-realization, and ethical life (Sittlichkeit) they should ideally support. This book considers whether society, like an organism, can become “sick” when its core structures malfunction, and what it would mean to diagnose and treat these malfunctions not only as instances of injustice but as symptoms of deeper ethical and social pathologies.
Central to Neuhouser’s exploration is the notion of alienation, particularly as developed in the works of Hegel and Marx. For Hegel, alienation within society stems from a failure to reconcile the individual’s subjective freedom with the objective norms embedded in social institutions, leading to an existence within society that feels hollow or estranged. Neuhouser carefully unpacks Hegel’s belief that social health requires a form of reconciliation where social norms do not merely constrain individuals but also enable and fulfill them, allowing freedom to be realized in ethical life. In this respect, Neuhouser situates Hegel’s theory of alienation as a precursor to Marx’s concept of estranged labor, wherein workers become separated from their labor, its products, and even their own essence. Neuhouser deftly contrasts these two thinkers, revealing how both conceptualize alienation not as a surface symptom of discontent but as a sign of a deeper, structural pathology within society.
Through his analysis of Durkheim, Neuhouser turns to the pathology of anomie—a state of normlessness that arises when traditional social norms lose their regulatory power, often as a result of rapid social changes. Neuhouser illustrates Durkheim’s understanding of anomie as a pathology of modernity, where individuals, stripped of collective moral guidance, experience a form of disorientation that can lead to both personal suffering and societal breakdown. Durkheim’s treatment of anomie is connected to his broader functionalist perspective, which views society as an organismic entity where each part must function harmoniously for the collective good. In Durkheim’s view, a healthy society is one where the moral function of institutions reinforces social solidarity, a balance that anomie disrupts by undermining the shared values and norms that bind individuals together.
The book also goes into Rousseau’s philosophical anthropology, which centers on the corrupting effects of social institutions on human self-love (amour-propre). Neuhouser examines how Rousseau critiques the emergence of inequality and competition as forces that alienate individuals from their authentic selves, replacing natural self-worth with a socially constructed, and thus fragile, self-worth dependent on the recognition of others. This process, Rousseau argues, gives rise to a pathological form of self-love that fuels envy, shame, and discord within society, a diagnosis Neuhouser considers alongside Hegelian alienation and Durkheimian anomie as another dimension of social pathology.
Neuhouser’s treatment of Marx positions him uniquely within this discussion of social pathology. For Marx, the structural imperatives of capitalism lead to the alienation of workers and the exploitation of labor, creating conditions that not only lead to injustice but also inhibit the fulfillment of human capacities. Neuhouser underscores that Marx’s critique of capitalism is not only a call for justice but a diagnosis of a deeper pathology: capitalism, by prioritizing profit over human development, thwarts the realization of human potential and community. In Marx’s theory, this systemic alienation arises not merely from isolated acts of exploitation but from a comprehensive social structure that perpetuates estrangement. Neuhouser suggests that for Marx, the capitalist system itself is “sick,” reproducing inequalities and forms of dehumanization that can only be “treated” through transformative, revolutionary change.
In discussing each of these thinkers, Neuhouser raises important methodological questions about the concept of social pathology. He contends that diagnosing social pathologies requires an immanent critique—one that identifies contradictions within society’s own norms and ideals. For example, when Hegel critiques society’s failure to live up to its promise of freedom, or when Durkheim critiques the disintegration of moral norms in the face of industrialization, they are invoking the society’s own standards. Neuhouser argues that social critique should expose ways in which society’s self-understanding is at odds with its actual functioning, thereby identifying specific social ailments that hinder the achievement of society’s ethical ends.
Diagnosing Social Pathology offers a compelling re-evaluation of critical social theory by arguing for the relevance and philosophical significance of the concept of societal illness. Neuhouser’s work not only situates Rousseau, Hegel, Marx, and Durkheim within a novel interpretative framework but also advances a methodology for diagnosing and critiquing social maladies that persist in modern societies. In so doing, he challenges readers to think beyond justice as the sole criterion for critique, suggesting instead that social philosophy must also reckon with ethical ideals of human flourishing and self-realization that, when unmet, reveal a society to be fundamentally unwell. This ambitious and thought-provoking study invites us to reconsider what it means to live in a “healthy” society and how philosophy might diagnose and address the pathologies that prevent societies from realizing their full potential.
Simon Gros 
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