Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism by Dieter Henrich, edited by David S. Pacini, is a monumental contribution to the study of classical German philosophy and remains an invaluable resource for both scholars and students navigating the complexities of post-Kantian thought. The volume, distilled from Henrich’s seminal lectures at Harvard in 1973, constitutes a key intellectual journey through the complex terrain between Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Henrich’s unique position as one of Germany’s most distinguished philosophers allows him to elucidate the philosophical developments that unfolded in this transformative period with unparalleled clarity, precision, and depth. His lectures, edited with careful scholarship by Pacini, are an entry point into the heart of German Idealism, capturing the dynamism of philosophical inquiry during an era when the intellectual landscape was in rapid flux.
Henrich’s analysis of German Idealism situates itself within the transition that followed Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, a text that redefined philosophy by attempting to reconcile metaphysical speculation with epistemological rigor. Henrich’s interpretation begins with Kant but moves swiftly to the crisis that Kant’s system engendered. While Kant’s work had reshaped the foundations of philosophical thought by proposing that human cognition is structured by innate categories, it had also, paradoxically, provoked a profound tension. This tension lay in the disjunction between Kant’s critical limitations on human knowledge—rooted in his insistence on the unknowability of things-in-themselves—and the enduring metaphysical yearnings of the Enlightenment. Henrich explores how Kant’s successors wrestled with these limitations, focusing on their attempts to both preserve and transcend his critical project.
Henrich carefully traces the revival of Spinoza’s philosophy in the works of F.H. Jacobi, whose critiques of Kant played a pivotal role in catalyzing the post-Kantian debates. Jacobi’s confrontation with the implications of Kantian dualism—particularly regarding freedom, determinism, and the limits of reason—set the stage for the idealist movement. For Jacobi, Kant had effectively severed the possibility of philosophical knowledge of the absolute, thus risking a slide into skepticism. Henrich demonstrates how Jacobi’s turn to Spinoza symbolized both a rejection of Kant’s transcendental idealism and a radical reassertion of metaphysical necessity. This revival ignited a fierce debate among Kant’s successors, particularly Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Friedrich Schelling, whose efforts to reconcile freedom and necessity within a systematic framework would reshape the course of German philosophy.
Central to Henrich’s analysis is his exhaustive treatment of Fichte’s Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre). Henrich’s exposition of Fichte’s thought is one of the most detailed and comprehensive available in English. He provides a penetrating analysis of how Fichte transformed Kant’s transcendental subject into an active, self-positing ego, thus elevating the problem of self-consciousness to the center of philosophical inquiry. In Fichte’s system, Henrich sees the emergence of a new constellation of problems, particularly regarding the status of subjectivity and the relationship between the individual and the absolute. Henrich’s examination of Fichte is not merely historical but deeply philosophical, offering a critical appraisal of Fichte’s attempt to resolve the contradictions inherent in Kant’s system by developing a radical form of idealism that posits the self as both the source and limit of all experience.
Henrich’s treatment of Romanticism, especially in the figures of Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel, and his insights into the poet Hölderlin’s philosophy are equally illuminating. Henrich deftly connects the Romantic movement’s concern with art, poetry, and the absolute to the broader philosophical project initiated by Fichte. He argues that Romanticism can be seen as a response to the perceived failures of systematic philosophy, particularly its inability to fully account for the lived, experiential dimensions of human existence. The Romantics sought to express in poetic and aesthetic terms what they saw as the ineffability of the absolute—a project Henrich ties directly to the theoretical developments in post-Kantian philosophy. The interplay between Fichtean self-positing and Romantic subjectivity reveals, according to Henrich, a shared commitment to overcoming the dualisms that Kant had left unresolved.
Henrich’s analysis culminates in his interpretation of Hegel, whose Phenomenology of Spirit marks the apotheosis of the movement that began with Kant. For Henrich, Hegel’s system represents the most sophisticated attempt to synthesize the insights of his predecessors while also addressing the failures of their systems. Where Kant and Fichte had faltered in their attempts to reconcile the finite and the infinite, Hegel’s dialectical method offers a dynamic solution. By positing that the absolute is not a static entity but a process—one that unfolds through the development of self-consciousness in history—Hegel transcends the limitations of both Kant’s critical idealism and Fichte’s subjective idealism.
Henrich’s interpretation of Hegel is deeply influenced by his own philosophical commitments, particularly his focus on the problem of self-consciousness and the nature of systematicity in philosophy. He argues that Hegel’s system, with its incorporation of nature, mind, and history, offers a model for a comprehensive philosophical framework, one that continues to resonate in contemporary debates about the nature of reason, freedom, and the human condition.
Between Kant and Hegel is not a simple historical reconstruction of the development of German Idealism, but a philosophical work in its own right. Henrich’s treatment of these figures is deeply informed by his own philosophical concerns, particularly his focus on the problem of self-consciousness, a theme that runs throughout the entire book. He shows how the post-Kantian philosophers, each in their own way, grappled with the question of how a self-conscious subject could exist within a world that appears to be governed by objective laws. This problem, which remains a central issue in contemporary philosophy, is explored in depth through Henrich’s close readings of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.
The importance of Between Kant and Hegel lies in its ability to make the complex and often obscure developments of German Idealism accessible to a broader audience. Henrich’s lectures are distinguished by their clarity, philosophical rigor, and sensitivity to the nuances of the thinkers he discusses. David Pacini’s editorial work enhances this clarity by providing helpful annotations and linking Henrich’s interpretations to contemporary debates in philosophy. The book is a model of how historical and philosophical scholarship can be brought together to illuminate both the past and the present.
Between Kant and Hegel is an indispensable guide to one of the most fertile periods in the history of philosophy. Henrich’s ability to combine historical analysis with philosophical insight makes this volume a masterful study of the development of German Idealism. For those seeking to understand the transition from Kant to Hegel, and the philosophical problems that continue to arise from this tradition, Henrich’s lectures offer a clear and comprehensive account that will remain a touchstone for scholars and students alike for years to come.
Simon Gros 
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