Thinking and the I: Hegel and the Critique of Kant by Alfredo Ferrarin is an ambitious analysis of the relationship between thought and the subjectivity of the thinker, a question that has reverberated through the history of Western philosophy. At the heart of this problem lies a fundamental challenge to the prevailing assumptions of modern philosophy from Descartes to Kant, assumptions that continue to inform our everyday understanding of thinking. The prevailing view, shared not only by philosophers but also by common sense, asserts that thought is inherently tied to a thinking subject, an “I” who performs the act of thinking. This “I” is understood as a self-conscious agent whose thoughts are mental acts directed toward objects outside itself. Concepts, in this framework, are tools the mind uses to represent and engage with a reality that exists independently of thought.
Ferrarin, however, undertakes a rigorous examination of Hegel’s philosophy to demonstrate that this ordinary conception of thinking is, for Hegel, deeply flawed. The book deconstructs the assumption that thought can be adequately understood as the activity of a self-conscious subject. For Hegel, thought transcends the boundaries of subjective mental acts and is instead objective in several critical senses. Ferrarin’s work elucidates how, in Hegel’s system, reality itself is permeated by a logic of thought, a dynamic and unconscious process that shapes and constitutes the very fabric of the world. This is a logic that manifests itself in concrete, determinate forms, and it operates independently of any subjective thinker. Hegel’s philosophy, therefore, offers a radical rethinking of the relationship between thought and reality, one that fundamentally challenges the dualisms of subject and object, inner and outer, and form and content, which have dominated modern philosophy.
Central to Ferrarin’s exposition is Hegel’s notion of dialectic, a process that is not simply a method of argumentation or a way of relating concepts, but the very movement of reality itself. Dialectic, in Hegel’s view, is the self-unfolding of the Idea, a process through which reality becomes progressively more self-aware, culminating in the realization that thought is the essence of reality. This dialectical process is not driven by the subjective will of an individual thinker but is an objective necessity that governs the development of both thought and being. Ferrarin carefully unpacks Hegel’s complex and often opaque language to reveal a conception of thought as an objective force, one that operates through negation, contradiction, and synthesis to generate the structures of reality itself.
This objective conception of thought stands in stark contrast to the Kantian framework, where the self-conscious subject plays a central role in the constitution of knowledge. Kant posits that the “I think” must accompany all representations for them to be meaningful, thus anchoring thought in the activity of the self-conscious subject. Hegel, as Ferrarin shows, rejects this view as one-sided and insufficient. For Hegel, the “I” is not the source of thought but rather one of its manifestations. Thought, in its truest sense, is not the property of an individual subject; rather, the subject is a product of thought, emerging from and sustained by the objective logic that pervades reality. The “I” is thus both a result and an expression of the larger dialectical process that governs the development of thought and reality.
Ferrarin’s book also engages in a detailed comparison between Hegel and Kant on the nature of reason. While Kant conceives of reason as a faculty that imposes order on the chaotic data of sense experience, Hegel sees reason as immanent in the world itself, a process that actualizes itself in the unfolding of history and nature. Ferrarin argues that Hegel’s critique of Kant is based on a misunderstanding of Kant’s project, suggesting that many of Hegel’s criticisms are rooted in a superficial reading of Kant’s texts. By reexamining the relationship between Hegel’s and Kant’s philosophies, Ferrarin opens up the possibility of a more nuanced and productive dialogue between the two, challenging the sharp divisions that have traditionally separated their thought.
One of the most significant contributions of Ferrarin’s work is its challenge to contemporary interpretations of Hegel, which often seek to align Hegel’s thought with various forms of transcendental, neopragmatist, or realist philosophy. Ferrarin insists on a return to the original core of Hegel’s dialectic, a move that involves rejecting the reduction of Hegel’s thought to a mere continuation of Kantian themes. Instead, Ferrarin presents Hegel as a philosopher who offers a radical alternative to the entire tradition of modern philosophy, one that requires us to rethink the very nature of thought, reality, and subjectivity.
Thinking and the I is an essential text for anyone seeking to understand the depths of Hegel’s philosophy and its implications for the broader tradition of German idealism. Ferrarin’s scholarship is characterized by a deep engagement with the primary texts, a clear and rigorous argumentative style, and a commitment to uncovering the original insights of Hegel’s thought. The book not only offers a detailed and systematic exposition of Hegel’s philosophy but also provides a critical reexamination of the relationship between Hegel and Kant, shedding new light on the philosophical dialogue between these two towering figures. Through this work, Ferrarin invites us to reconsider our most basic assumptions about thinking, the “I,” and the nature of reality, offering a fresh perspective on some of the most fundamental questions in philosophy.
Simon Gros 
Leave a comment