The Young Spinoza: A Metaphysician in the Making, edited by Yitzhak Y. Melamed, stands as a seminal contribution to the field of Spinoza studies, offering an unprecedented exploration of the early intellectual development of one of philosophy’s most enigmatic and influential figures. The volume arrives at a moment of renewed interest in Spinoza within Anglo-American philosophy, yet it diverges from the traditional focus on his later, more mature works—particularly the Ethics and the Theological-Political Treatise—by concentrating instead on his early writings and correspondence. This collection of twenty essays, authored by an international roster of both established and emerging scholars, seeks to illuminate the philosophical genesis of Spinoza’s thought, offering a rigorous examination of the ideas and concepts that would eventually culminate in his later, more famous works.
Philosophy does not emerge in a vacuum; rather, it is the result of a complex interplay of influences, intellectual struggles, and gradual developments. The editors of The Young Spinoza recognize this fundamental truth, seeking to trace the evolution of Spinoza’s metaphysical ideas from their nascent stages to their more fully articulated forms. This exploration is guided by the recognition that Spinoza’s mature works did not appear ex nihilo—from nothing—but rather grew out of a rich and intricate intellectual background, one that is often overshadowed by the towering presence of the Ethics. This volume challenges the teleological reading that views Spinoza’s early works merely as preparatory steps toward the more sophisticated doctrines of his later years. Instead, it proposes that these early texts possess their own intrinsic value and offer distinct insights that are sometimes overshadowed by the more well-known positions of the Ethics.
The essays collected in this volume are methodologically diverse, reflecting the multifaceted nature of Spinoza’s early philosophy. Some essays adopt an additive approach, suggesting that the variations found in the early works should be seen as supplementary to the later writings, enhancing our understanding of concepts that are more fully developed in the Ethics. Others, however, take a subtractive approach, interpreting these early differences as evidence of Spinoza’s intellectual evolution, marking the abandonment of certain ideas in favor of new, more refined positions. This methodological tension is not merely academic but reflects the very real difficulties inherent in tracing the development of a philosopher whose ideas were in constant flux, particularly during the formative period covered by this volume.
One of the central themes explored in The Young Spinoza is the role of entia rationis—beings of reason—in Spinoza’s early metaphysical framework. John Carriero, in his essay Spinoza, the Will, and the Ontology of Power, offers a compelling interpretation of Spinoza’s claim in the Korte Verhandeling that the will cannot be a cause because it is a being of reason. Carriero’s analysis hinges on Spinoza’s ontology of power, suggesting that the will does not play a role in the intrinsic structure of nature, which is composed solely of Nature itself, its inherent invariances, and the particular things that are determinations of these invariances. Samuel Newlands, in his essay Spinoza’s Early Anti-Abstractionism, expands on this theme by examining how beings of reason, such as moral concepts like ‘good’ and ‘evil,’ function within Spinoza’s critique of abstraction in the early works. Newlands argues that Spinoza believed many theological, moral, and political disputes arise from the mistaken assumption that these abstract entities are real, substantive features of the world.
Karolina Hübner, in her essay Spinoza on Negation, Mind-Dependence, and Reality of the Finite, challenges the notion that Spinoza was an acosmist—a thinker who denies the reality of finite things. She argues that finite entities in Spinoza’s thought can be understood as “well-founded entia rationis,” thereby allowing for the possibility of true knowledge of things that are known only abstractly. This interpretation offers a nuanced defense against the charge of acosmism, suggesting that while Spinoza did not conceive of finite things as illusory, he did not attribute to them the same level of reality as the infinite modes. This approach opens new avenues for understanding Spinoza’s complex metaphysical positions, particularly in relation to the reality of the finite.
The problem of truth in Spinoza’s early writings is another focal point of the volume. John Morrison’s essay, Truth in the Emendation, grapples with the challenge of defining truth within Spinoza’s framework, particularly in the unfinished Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. Morrison surveys existing interpretations, ranging from correspondence theories to coherence and causal accounts, and ultimately proposes a novel interpretation he dubs the “essentric” account. This interpretation seeks to reconcile the different features of truth as Spinoza saw them, offering a more comprehensive understanding of how Spinoza conceived of true ideas.
Valtteri Viljanen, in Spinoza’s Essentialism in the Short Treatise, delves into Spinoza’s commitment to the notion that all things have a definable essence, even in his early works. Viljanen argues that Spinoza’s early commitment to essentialism reflects a deep-seated belief in the intelligibility and stability of reality, a view that remains consistent throughout his philosophical career. However, Viljanen also highlights the differences between Spinoza’s early and later treatments of essences, particularly noting that Spinoza was more explicit about the individuality of essences in the KV than he was in the Ethics. This raises the interpretative question of whether Spinoza’s later, more ambiguous treatment of essences reflects a shift in his thinking or simply a different emphasis.
Tad M. Schmaltz, in his essay Spinoza on Eternity and Duration: The 1663 Connection, addresses one of the perennial questions in Spinoza scholarship: the nature of eternity. Schmaltz draws on Harry A. Wolfson’s distinction between Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of eternity to argue that Spinoza consistently held a bifurcated view—Platonic concerning God’s eternity and Aristotelian regarding the eternity of infinite modes. Schmaltz’s analysis, while not entirely novel, offers a compact and compelling account that challenges some conventional readings of Spinoza’s concept of eternity, particularly in relation to the human mind in the fifth part of the Ethics.
The volume is not merely an exploration of Spinoza’s early metaphysical positions but also a broader reflection on the nature of philosophical development. By bringing together a diverse array of essays that collectively shed light on the young Spinoza’s intellectual journey, The Young Spinoza serves as a crucial resource for anyone seeking to understand how one of the greatest minds in Western philosophy evolved over time. The essays within this volume do not just recount the historical development of Spinoza’s thought but engage deeply with the philosophical issues that preoccupied him, offering insights that are as valuable to contemporary metaphysics as they are to the history of philosophy.
This book is indispensable for Spinoza scholars and those interested in early modern philosophy more generally. It challenges the reader to reconsider the often-overlooked early works of Spinoza, not as mere stepping stones to his later achievements but as rich, complex texts worthy of study in their own right. As such, The Young Spinoza is a significant contribution to Spinoza scholarship, one that will undoubtedly stimulate further research and debate in the field.
Simon Gros 
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