Béatrice Longuenesse’s I, Me, Mine: Back to Kant, and Back Again stands as a significant contribution to contemporary philosophical discourse, presenting an ambitious approach to the age-old questions surrounding self-consciousness and the use of the first-person pronoun ‘I’. This work goes through the complex terrain of self-reference and personal identity, exploring these themes through a multifaceted dialogue between historical and contemporary perspectives. An investigation into the nature of the self, the structure of thought, and the underlying conditions that make self-consciousness possible.
Longuenesse’s presentation is an analysis of the first-person pronoun ‘I’, a seemingly simple word that, upon closer examination, reveals a variety of philosophical problems. The book begins by engaging with contemporary discussions on the use of ‘I’ in language and thought, drawing on the work of influential figures such as Wittgenstein and his critics. Longuenesse examines how these philosophers have grappled with the distinctions between the use of ‘I’ as subject and ‘I’ as object, a distinction that, while rooted in Wittgensteinian analysis, has broad implications for understanding self-reference and self-consciousness. Wittgenstein’s insights into the nature of self-reference and the unique role of the first-person pronoun in thought and language serve as a foundation for much of the contemporary debate, yet Longuenesse moves beyond these foundations to offer a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the issue.
One of the key points of contention in these discussions is whether the ‘I’ in ‘I think’ refers to a particular entity—a physical body, for instance—or whether it refers to a more abstract form of self-consciousness that cannot be reduced to a mere object among objects. Longuenesse revisits Kant’s assertion that the ‘I’ in ‘I think’ expresses a kind of self-consciousness that is fundamentally different from the consciousness of oneself as a physical object. According to Kant, when we say ‘I think,’ we are not referring to our bodies or any other object in the world but to the act of thinking itself, an act that presupposes a unity of consciousness that cannot be fully captured by reference to any material entity.
In her analysis, Longuenesse demonstrates that Kant’s perspective on self-consciousness offers a valuable counterpoint to the prevailing views in contemporary philosophy, which often emphasize the bodily basis of self-reference. She shows that while our awareness of our own bodies undoubtedly plays a crucial role in our sense of self, it is not sufficient to account for the full complexity of self-consciousness. The ‘I’ that Kant discusses is not an object of empirical knowledge, but a necessary condition for the possibility of knowledge itself. It is through the ‘I think’ that the unity of our mental states is secured, enabling us to recognize ourselves as the same thinking subject over time.
Longuenesse also draws attention to the limitations of purely bodily accounts of self-consciousness, particularly those put forward by philosophers such as Quassim Cassam and Gareth Evans. These thinkers have argued that awareness of one’s body is essential for self-reference, suggesting that the use of ‘I’ is inherently tied to our physical embodiment. However, Longuenesse contends that this view overlooks the deeper, transcendental aspects of self-consciousness that Kant illuminates. While bodily awareness is certainly important, it does not fully explain the capacity for self-reference that Kant attributes to the ‘I think’. For Kant, the act of thinking itself, the synthesis of representations according to logical rules, is what allows for the use of ‘I’ in a way that transcends mere physical self-awareness.
In the second part of her book, Longuenesse turns to a detailed examination of Kant’s own writings, particularly his discussion of the ‘I think’ in the Critique of Pure Reason. She revisits Kant’s arguments concerning the transcendental unity of apperception, the idea that the ‘I think’ must accompany all of our representations if they are to belong to a single, unified consciousness. Longuenesse elucidates the complex relationship between the ‘I think’ and the categories of the understanding, showing how Kant’s analysis of self-consciousness is deeply connected with his broader epistemological project. For Kant, the ‘I think’ is not just a statement of fact but a fundamental condition for the possibility of experience; it is what makes it possible for us to relate our various perceptions and thoughts to a single, enduring self.
Longuenesse’s interpretation of Kant offers new insights into the philosopher’s treatment of the self. She argues that Kant’s analysis of the ‘I think’ is not merely a formal exercise in logic but has implications for our understanding of personal identity and moral responsibility. The unity of consciousness that Kant describes is not only a precondition for knowledge but also for moral agency, as it allows us to see ourselves as the authors of our actions and to hold ourselves accountable for them.
In the final section of the book, Longuenesse brings Kant’s ideas into conversation with the psychological theories of Sigmund Freud, particularly his concepts of the ego and the superego. She draws striking parallels between Kant’s notion of the unity of consciousness and Freud’s theory of the ego as the organizing principle of the psyche. Freud’s ego, like Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception, is responsible for the synthesis of mental contents, ensuring that our thoughts and perceptions cohere into a unified experience. However, whereas Kant’s analysis is transcendental, dealing with the conditions for the possibility of experience, Freud’s approach is empirical, focusing on the developmental processes through which the ego emerges and operates within the psyche.
Longuenesse argues that Freud’s metapsychology can be seen as a naturalistic extension of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, providing a psychological account of how the unity of consciousness develops and functions in the context of a lived human life. By linking Kant’s ‘I think’ to Freud’s ego, she opens up new avenues for understanding the connections between philosophical and psychological theories of the self. This synthesis of Kantian and Freudian thought offers a rich and complex picture of the self, one that bridges the gap between transcendental philosophy and empirical psychology.
I, Me, Mine: Back to Kant, and Back Again is a masterful work that challenges readers to rethink the nature of the self and the foundations of self-consciousness. Through her careful analysis of Kant, Wittgenstein, and Freud, Longuenesse not only clarifies the complex issues surrounding the use of ‘I’ but also offers a new synthesis that integrates philosophical and psychological perspectives on the self. This book is essential reading for anyone interested in the intersections of philosophy, psychology, and the study of human cognition. Longuenesse’s work pushes the boundaries of our understanding, offering a profound and original contribution to the ongoing debate about what it means to be a self-conscious being.
Simon Gros 
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